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ABSTRACT (SUMMARY) 
This paper explores and explains the means of gaining a following and a sense of trust among 
potential voters or other political figures. First off, the paper focuses on rhetoric in politics – 
how it has developed and evolved from the ancient times until now, and what significance it 
really had in each major period in history where political discourse was prominent. Following 
that, the focus is on persuasion and in what ways this discourse needs to be formed in order to 
serve its purpose. After the two seemingly theoretical chapters, various speech devices and 
appeals present in almost every political speech are singled out and examined. In the 
conclusion, I reflect upon the content of the paper and consequently give my own opinion on 
the topic. 
 
 
SAŽETAK 
Ovaj rad istražuje i objašnjava kako postići povjerenje i potporu među potencijalnim 
glasačima ili drugim političkim figurama. Rad će se prvo fokusirati na retoriku u politici, 
odnosno, kako se razvijala od antike do sada, te koji je značaj zbilja imala u svakom većem 
povijesnom periodu gdje je politički diskurs bio od velike važnosti. Nakon toga, dolazimo do 
pojma uvjeravanja, čije će značenje prvo biti objašnjeno, a zatim slijedi analiza načina na koji 
diskurz mora biti formiran da ostvarimo ciljeve uvjeravanja. Nakon dva poglavlja koja su više 
teoretske prirode, treće poglavlje se okreće primjerima iz prakse, odnosno, jezičnim figurama 
i apelima, gdje će se pojedine vrste opisati i analizirati. U zaključku ću se osvrnuti na cijeli 
rad te dati mišljenje vezano temu i sadržaj rada. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Politics is unavoidable no matter how much we try to distance ourselves from it. 
Maybe one would not want to hear about it, but the fact is that it dictates the quality of their 
life.  
The main problem is – out of all politicians out there, who can be trusted? Though 
certain political parties represent a set of already defined customs and ideas (e.g. right/left-
wing parties), they do not necessarily act accordingly and sometimes tend to “forget” about 
certain aspects that may just be important to a group of people who in a way “trusted” a 
political party to ensure them a decent life standard or just lessen the discrimination against 
them as a group. This very often results in people thinking that no matter the political 
alignment, all parties (politicians) are the same and only think of themselves.  
This may be the end result of elections, but the main topic that will be discussed in this 
paper is how politicians get to this position in the first place. The biggest part of that process 
is the attempt to successfully appeal to the masses via speech – potential candidates need to 
convince the audience that what they represent will be beneficial both for the country and its 
people in various press conferences and interviews. The saying “Actions speak louder than 
words” is quite true in itself, but in these situations the candidates are put in a position where 
they have to vocalize their future actions – since they need a certain amount of power and 
influence to perform specific actions (laws, regulations, etc.), they first need to gain enough 
power and influence over potential voters (in democratic systems) or other political figures 
through their words. One of the ways they can achieve that is to brush up on their rhetorical 
and persuasive skills. The role of rhetoric and persuasion in politics is precisely what this 
paper focuses on. 
In the first chapter, “History of Rhetoric and Politics”, an insight will be given in 
terms how political matters and the practice of rhetoric regarding those matters were handled 
in major historical points, starting from Ancient Greece and The Roman Empire, following 
the influence they had on Humanism and The Renaissance and its critique formed in early 
modern politics, and how after those critiques political speeches and the relationship to the 
audience are regarded in present times. 
The second chapter, “Persuasion”, deals with defining the same notion and how it is 
approached, as well as it serves as a guide on forming arguments in various types of dialogues 
that appear in political debates, interviews and in terms of propaganda.  
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The third, closing chapter “Speech figures and Appeals” analyzes the notions that are 
present in speeches in real time. Speech figures and appeals serve as a tool to rhetoric and 
successful persuasion. However, they will be analyzed in terms whether they actually are 
advantageous in political speeches, especially appeals in that regard. 
Finally in the conclusion, I will give my own review of the topics mentioned in this 
paper, as well as point out their value in current events. 
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CHAPTER 1: HISTORY OF RHETORIC AND POLITICS 
Before describing how it has developed and what impact it has, we must first define 
rhetoric as a term and practice. There is not only one clear definition, since the term itself 
contains a certain amount of complexity. MacDonald at first explains that “the English word 
"rhetoric" stems from the Greek rhetorike, which means the art of the public speaker (rhetor) 
or politician” (Macdonald, 2017: 4). However, he further elaborates the difficulties that arise 
when defining rhetorics: 
A further difficulty in defining rhetoric is that the meaning of the English word 
"rhetoric:' like the Greek word logos, encompasses both the art of rhetoric and its 
products (e.g., persuasion, speeches, texts, advertisements, etc.). As a 
consequence, the terms "rhetoric" and "rhetorical" are today used to describe a 
baffling array of practices and artifacts, so much so that it is perhaps more 
appropriate to speak of "rhetorics" than rhetoric.” (MacDonald, 2017: 5) 
It is important to note that the description and understanding of the term varied throughout 
history – to put it simply, due to the term being somewhat ambiguous, this has opened many 
doors not only in the sense of redefining the word, but also in redefining the act itself.  
In the beginning, rhetoric and its practice were mostly seen as a beneficial factor 
regarding politics. However, when it comes to politics nowadays, rhetoric is usually looked 
down upon as it bears negative connotations, just as the notion of persuasion (which will be 
explained more in depth in the next chapter). James Martin makes a comment, stating that: 
In modern democracies we despise and fear speech just as much as (if not more 
than) we honor it. We curse the ‘liars’ and the deceivers just as we desire 
inspiration and eloquence from our leaders. […] Persuasive speech, we might say, 
functions as both poison and cure to democracy. By consequence, the skill of 
rhetoric, where speech is deliberately manipulated to render it persuasive, is 
quietly cherished but – more often than not – dismissed and derided. (Martin, 
2014: 3) 
Even though the practice of rhetorical speech is overlooked, it is important to remember its 
foundations and development. 
 
1.1 ANCIENT GREECE 
When it comes to rhetoric, ancient Greece is the place where it first emerged as a term and 
practice. Greek rhetoric refers to the emerging and evolving "discipline" that theorizes and 
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teaches an art of oral and written composition and performance aimed at influencing 
audiences (Schiappa, 2017: 33).  
It all started with the sophists around 500 BCE. Sophists can be understood as 
teachers/wise men as the word sophos means wisdom. Their teachings were based on how to 
speak and argue in the public realm – or simply, rhetoric (rhethorike) (Martin, 2014: 16). 
Martin further explains how it could have not been just a matter of skill development, but it 
also went hand in hand with the Athenian democratic system:  
Rhetorical instruction was not only a technical skill; it flowed from the Athenians’ 
idea of moral and civil life. […]  The Greek polis is widely known for its highly 
participatory system of politics. To be a citizen in this system was regarded as an 
honor that bestowed important duties upon the individual. The freedoms of the 
citizen were understood to be closely associated with a commitment to a sense of 
the common good. (Martin, 2014: 17) 
However, sophistic rhetoric, according to Plato’s writings, was based on manipulation and 
deceptive use of argument to achieve political success, regardless of the truth. Also, Plato 
claimed that its goal was to make the worse argument appear the better (Schiappa, 2017: 36). 
On the other hand, some scholars believe that the teachings of practical argumentation were 
valuable and necessary for the democratic system as it encouraged interaction with the 
citizens (Schiappa, 2017: 37) 
It is important to know how the democratic system of Athens worked in order to 
perceive the relation between the speakers and the audience. There were three main functions: 
the deliberative part (the Council and Assembly), the judicial and the magistrates. The 
Council and Assembly dealt with matters that were related to the entire community as 
opposed to the courts (Harris, 2017: 53). With that in regard, Harris concludes:   
Speeches were therefore not designed to gain power for politicians at elections so 
that they could control the government. To gain the support of the Assembly, 
speakers had to address everyone, not just their supporters. They had to portray 
themselves as statesmen who aimed to benefit all citizens. (Harris, 2017: 55) 
Another important characteristic of speeches was that they mostly appealed to the traditional 
values of the majority, again portraying the intention of benefiting everyone (Harris, 2017: 
55). It seems that the most used form of argument in order to persuade the Assembly was 
appeal to public interest. Also, reminding the audience of past actions and encouraging 
citizens to live up to their past were some of the notions present in many speeches (Harris, 
2017: 56-57). 
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It is important to mention that not all kinds of speeches were suitable for the Assembly. 
In fact, Aristotle and the (unknown) author of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum divided speech 
into three parts: the judicial, deliberative, and epideictic. Aristotle explains each one and to 
whom it is applicable. A judicial speech, as the name suggests, is concerned with the court: 
In the law court, there is either an accusation or a defense. This kind of speech 
concerns the past because the accusation and the defense examine what has been 
done. The goal of the speaker is to prove that an action is just or unjust. The 
audience for this speech is the judge. (Harris, 2017: 60) 
A deliberative speech is described as follows: 
A deliberative speech aims either to exhort or dissuade and concerns the future 
because the speaker discusses future events. The goal of this kind of speech is to 
show that a certain course of action is going to be either advantageous or harmful. 
The audience for this kind of speech is the member of an assembly. (Harris, 2017: 
60) 
And finally, the aim of the epideictic speech is: 
The aim of the epideictic speech is to praise or to blame. This kind of speech 
generally looks to the present and praises or blames existing qualities but may 
also glance at the past and future. The audience of the epideictic speech consists 
of spectators who are concerned with the speaker's ability. (Harris, 2017; 60) 
Aristotle, unlike Plato, thought persuasive oratory to be valuable to the community. However, 
the goal was not to meet certain ideal principles, but rather, it was the ability of the orator to 
make a case in matters that did not require an ideal foundation (Martin, 2014: 23). 
To conclude, the main goal of Greek rhetoric was to convey ideas and persuade the 
audience, in order to gain influence over a collective, the speakers had to ensure that with 
their ideas the collective will not only be ensured safety, but also moral and interpersonal 
strength that binds the audience closer to each other. Notions such as appealing to past 
successes and the popular opinions of the time, as well as respecting the values of the majority 
is what, according to these sources, made a speech convincing.   
 
1.2 THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
Rhetoric was vital to the young male elite, as it served as a guide on how to maintain and 
defend their position in the public field. The practice of rhetoric was a sign of social privilege 
as it implied social and political power of the patrician class (Dominik, 2017: 159). 
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In the beginning, Roman rhetoric was essentially Greek rhetoric adapted to the Roman 
environment, principally the law courts and public assemblies, though it always involved 
more than just public speaking (Dominik, 2017: 160) 
In her essay, Connolly describes how status affected the ability of being a speaker: 
Roman politics, economic, religious, legal, and political authority thus intersected 
and supported one another, made visible and audible through common patterns of 
stance and gesture and familiar patterns of speech. Cicero and Quintilian are 
keenly alert to the skills and the opportunities for self-distinction that rhetorical 
training grants to men engaged in the intraelite competition for ruling power. In 
this context, the audience possesses little political significance beyond its service 
as a marker of elite popularity and prestige. (Connolly, 2017: 184) 
However, Connolly stresses that giving a speech itself is prone to uncertainty and the outcome 
cannot be controlled, therefore, mutual understanding and connection of both sides is crucial 
for the speech to result in success. Also, it is mentioned that in the speeches unnecessary 
complexity was avoided – they were cohesive and dynamic (Connolly, 2017: 184). 
Furthermore, she describes how Jacques Ranciere thinks the relationship between the 
patrician and the plebeians in the matter of speaking should function: 
Acts of narrative are based on the assumption of the existence of a relation of 
equal exchange. […] The hierarchy of the relationship of a single patrician to the 
plebeians is thus replaced by a different relationship, that of narrator to listeners, a 
relationship whose egalitarian elements are enacted in the course of storytelling 
itself. (Connolly, 2017: 184) 
Cicero very often referred to this principle. As Connolly explains, Cicero defines politics not 
as the possession of power but as persuasive communication, which arises from the common 
capacity of human beings to convey meaning to one another (Connolly, 2017: 185). In his 
work De Oratore the senators Crassus and Antonius discuss the functions of rhetoric. The 
functions are described in this manner: 
Crassus describes the orator's practice as engagement in a serial contest that holds 
gatherings of human beings together and retains them in their civil state. In the act 
of turning men toward one another, eloquent words substitute for weapons and 
defenses in the ongoing struggles of the law court and public assembly that 
maintain the conditions under which the state can survive. (Connolly, 2017: 185) 
Some of the topics politicians or speakers would often bring up in order to connect to the 
plebeians were: the people’s liberty, the rights of protection against the Senate, as well as the 
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senators’ duty towards the citizens, Rome’s cultural superiority and the spread of corruption 
(Connolly, 2017: 187). 
In Roman rhetoric the emphasis was on ethos, one of the three formal parts of rhetoric 
along with logos and pathos. In other words it is the presentation of character, and it was 
important because it bears a feature of transforming political values and propositions into 
moral ones (Connolly, 2017: 185). 
Another important feature used relating to the audience in Cicero and Quintilian’s 
practice was the sensus communis of emotion and taste. Connolly describes it as the common 
denominator shared by all citizens – the capacity to feel emotions and to render judgments of 
taste. By using that, the speaker can make his message come across with ease, as he takes the 
audience’s perspective into consideration (Connolly, 2017: 188). 
In the end Connolly briefly summarizes this period stating: 
Roman rhetorical discourse […] sees the creation and sustaining of collective 
enterprises from law and elections to war- and treaty-making as action, the action 
of speaking for persuasive purposes in the context of a collective involved in 
decision-making about its past (in the law court) and its future (in the assembly or 
the Senate). […] The potential for oratory to legitimize power in the status quo is 
matched by its power to undermine the status quo. (Connolly, 2017: 192) 
 
1.3 HUMANISM AND RENAISSANCE 
According to the humanists, true eloquence could arise only out of a harmonious union 
between wisdom and eloquence. The ideological basis of humanist rhetoric is the ratio-oratio 
principle, namely, that the unity of reason and rhetoric is the presupposition of an ideal or 
truly humanist society (Plett, 2017: 377). 
In Humanism and the Renaissance, Greek and Roman rhetoric was rediscovered, 
especially the works of Cicero. His texts made a big impact on the system of education and art 
practice, but also they were paramount for the political sphere, since Cicero himself was very 
involved in political matters. To master rhetoric in the Renaissance did not only mean to 
follow Cicero’s texts, but also to be well versed enough to encounter those who thought 
rhetoric to be a matter of both politics and law (Rebhorn, 2017: 388). 
W.A. Rebhorn explains how the duality in Cicero’s texts affected the politics of the 
Renaissance: 
The republican Cicero was, of course, a liberalis, a free man with the right to 
participate in the political activities of the Roman state, but when he thinks of the 
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orator's power he describes it paradoxically as worthy of both free men and kings. 
[…] One face offered a free republican rhetor engaged in combat with other 
rhetors; the other face made him a ruler who controlled an audience. […] The 
result is that the politics of Renaissance rhetoric can be defined as something like 
a debate or a dialogue between these two conflicting political models. (Rebhorn, 
2017: 388) 
However, it is important to mention that in the Renaissance most countries were monarchies, 
dukedoms or empires. Rhetoric was not only understood as a means of ruling in the ancient 
world – it also served as a guideline on how to rule to monarchs and dukes, as many 
rhetoricians dedicated their treatises to the members of the ruling class (especially in England 
and France) (Rebhorn, 2017: 388-389). 
On the other hand, Juan Luis Vives, a Spanish humanist, claimed that although 
eloquence is the most important rudder of society, it could not be applied in states where one 
man or an oligarchy rules, whereas in a democratic state the power of speech has enormous 
influence in many aspects such as public opinion, law, and even military matters (Rebhorn, 
2017: 389). His opinion opposed the popular concepts of the time; however Rebhorn in a way 
compares him to Machiavelli: 
While Vives is not known as a political thinker, he seems remarkably close to 
Niccolò Machiavelli here, whose Discourses identified the vitality of the Roman 
Republic precisely with the constant internal strife and disorderliness of the state. 
In the Renaissance, a period in which political order was generally valued, Vives's 
celebration of republican rhetoric and the disorder it entailed could not fail to put 
him at odds with almost everyone. (Rebhorn, 2017: 390) 
Montaigne also refers to republican rhetoric and the fact that it belongs only in democracy, 
however unlike Vives, he portrays its practice as a negative thing:  
Rhetoric is a tool invented to manipulate and stir up a mob and an unruly 
populace, a tool that is employed only in sick states, like medicine; in states, such 
as those of Athens, Rhodes, and Rome, where the crowd, the ignorant, where all 
the people had power over all things, and where things were in perpetual tempest, 
there the orators flooded in. (Montaigne, quoted by Kinney, 2015: 41) 
Though in the Renaissance the republican aspect of rhetoric was put aside, still, the teaching 
of rhetoric was presented through debate. The students were taught the argumentum in 
utramque partem, argument on each side (of a case), which was implicitly based on the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions common to a rhetorical understanding of the 
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world, namely, because there was no fixed truth and every question could have different 
answers depending on the perspective (Rebhorn, 2017: 392). 
Ending the discussion on the duality of Cicero’s rhetoric, Rebhorn concludes that: 
We can see that no matter how hard Renaissance rhetoricians sought to keep the 
two faces of Cicero's political rhetoric distinct from one another, the closer one 
actually looks at the discourse, the more difficult it becomes to keep those faces 
apart. (Rebhorn, 2017: 395) 
 
 
1.4 EARLY MODERN PERIOD’S CRITIQUE OF HUMANISM 
The turn toward absolutism in the later 16th century entailed a reconsideration of the political 
status of rhetoric (Gowland, 2017: 484). In this part the focus will be on the critiques by Jean 
Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. 
Bodin’s critique of rhetoric is short and quite simple. Bodin states that whatever the 
potential benefits of rhetoric, it has commonly caused factionalism and sedition – especially 
when orators are granted excessive freedom of speech (Gowland, 2017: 484). Gowland 
further adds that Bodin thinks that political matters should not be manipulated by rhetoric as it 
diverts from the truth: 
For Bodin, the potentially destabilizing power of political rhetoric should be 
strictly bounded, and not be permitted to encroach upon the formal preeminence 
of absolute sovereignty. Although eloquence is useful in dealing with the ignorant 
in democratic assemblies, it has no place in the senates or councils of aristocracies 
or monarchies, where discourse should be truthful and unadorned by rhetorical 
manipulation. (Gowland, 2017: 484) 
The only discourse that Bodin approves of is the one of the sovereign to his subjects, without 
any replies and the subjects’ consent (Gowland, 2017: 484). 
Thomas Hobbes elaborates a little bit more on why rhetoric cannot persist. He argues 
that deliberation in democracies is inherently flawed, exposing the arcana imperii to enemies 
and foreigners, permitting reasoning by eloquence, preferring the opinions of the many to the 
wisdom of the few, and provoking factional quarrels (Gowland, 2017: 489). 
James Martin briefly summarizes Hobbes’ viewpoint on power and public speech: 
For Hobbes, political power was to be conceived as the formation of an 
independent authority fundamentally separate from the people who authorized it. 
Yet Hobbes’s defense of absolute sovereign power was also theorized as a kind of 
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‘social contract’ – that is, as an agreement among those subject to power 
themselves. Once agreed as a legitimate power, however, the sovereign was free 
to decide the laws and determine the liberties – or not – of its citizens. […] 
Thereafter, citizens were not to speak on public matters. (Martin, 2014: 27) 
Furthermore, in Leviathan, Hobbes remarks that popular assemblies encourage those "whose 
interests are contrary to that of the Publique" to persuade others to adopt their views with 
passionate eloquence ( Gowland, 2017: 485). 
Hobbes may give out the impression of being radical, but some believe that his idea does not 
come from a place of selfishness. In his text, Martin refers to Terrence Ball, who says that: 
The uncertainty of the state of nature, as he depicted it, was a consequence not of 
humans with the speechless instincts of wild animals but, rather, of the surfeit of 
interpretations, ambiguities and misunderstandings among people who use 
language only too freely. (Martin, 2014: 29) 
However, in the end Hobbes comes to the conclusion that even though a form of eloquence 
will be required for the political implementation of rational arguments, it must be shaped "by 
Education, and Discipline" to correspond to reason and ensure that it is used "for adorning 
and preferring of Truth" rather than "Errour" (Gowland, 2017: 485). 
  
1.5 MODERN AND CONTEMORARY POLITICS 
In his book, Martin approaches contemporary politics from three standpoints – liberalism, 
critical theory and postmodernism. 
Starting with liberalism, the viewpoint of which is that in order to achieve individual 
freedom, the state and society should be separated. In that sense, individuals are free to 
choose to participate in public matters if they want to, but are not bound to do it. Also, Martin 
adds that the co-existence of separate public and private domains is achieved by constitutional 
controls on government and mediation between government and society by an informed elite 
(Martin, 2014: 43). 
One of the most significant liberal thinkers in the second half of the 20th century was 
John Rawls.  
In terms of rhetoric, Martin describes that Rawls thinks it is only a matter of individual 
choice if someone wants to deal with rhetoric: 
His argument defends the idea that particular private needs can be reconciled 
because a universal rationality demonstrates the justness of redistributive 
measures. In that argument, rational judgement is a subjective exercise and not a 
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practice of actual individuals communicating and persuading each other to shape 
their judgements. The ‘impartial’ reasoning that Rawls expounds is deemed to be 
transparently available to all rational individuals and does not require active 
debating among citizens. (Martin 2014: 44) 
It seems that liberalism implies that rhetoric and public speaking are not thought to extremely 
serious matters, but rather just a loose form of practicing freedom of expression and opinion. 
Finally, Martin compares how mild liberalism is in comparison to other theories:  
The virtue of a liberal order is not that it is philosophically grounded but that it 
sustains a common allegiance to individual liberty (however defined) and refuses 
the alternatives of moral coercion (as in Plato) or endless, disruptive conflict and 
insecurity (as in Hobbes). (Martin 2014: 45) 
The second standpoint, which is critical theory, aims to introduce greater practical 
involvement of citizens in the formulation of shared principles. Its proponents are open to the 
interaction of universality and particularity and to the place of aesthetics in shaping public life 
(Martin, 2014: 45). A key figure representing this view is Jürgen Habermas. He developed a 
theory of communicative action, in which citizens debated and held to account the authorities 
and powers that shaped their lives; so consequently, the goal of the theory is to advocate an 
intermediary space of dialogue where public life is exposed to the critical interrogation and 
opinion of its citizens. There was no concept of a preconceived common good and citizens 
themselves were to form moral principles via democratic procedures that structured their 
communication and enabled them to test the ‘validity’ of the normative claims they make 
(Martin, 2014: 46). 
Moreover, Martin describes the impact that discourse ethics brings to Habermas’ theory: 
By instituting forms of deliberation based on discourse ethics, he argues, citizens 
can – together – reach common judgements about their shared arrangements, 
eliminating claims that are untrue, inappropriate or insincere. The achievement of 
a rational consensus is, of course, only an ideal; any actual dialogue may fall short 
of fulfilling all the criteria to everyone’s satisfaction, but that does not, in his 
view, undermine its value as a democratic answer to the conditions of modern 
societies. […] Discourse ethics are designed to uphold the separation of state and 
society, yet also to mediate between the two in such a way that particular 
differences can be reconciled by means of (discursively revealed) universal 
principles. (Martin, 2014: 47) 
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Martin finishes off the critical theory part by mentioning that some critics think that discourse 
ethics may well pass off forms of power and control under the guise of universal reason 
(Martin, 2014: 47). 
The last view Martin touches upon is postmodernism. Martin remarks that: 
While there is no single dominant thinker in a postmodern approach, 
‘poststructuralist’ figures such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida stand as 
influential representatives. Central to their work is a rejection of the idea of the 
human subject, or self, conceived as a naturally autonomous, self-sufficient agent 
directed by its own conscious purposes and free will. This so-called ‘anti-
humanism’ undermines the view that universal principles can ever be finally 
found by gaining access to an uncontested truth free from contamination with 
particularity. (Martin, 2014: 48) 
Foucault thinks that an individual is the product of various ‘disciplinary’ practices and 
discourses that shape it from birth and impress upon it certain truths and abilities. However, 
he deems these pressures to be a form of power that grants the individual freedom of action in 
society. Also, Martin states that according to Foucault, “society is not a total structure 
operating around a power center that amasses control, but a diverse and uneven assemblage 
riven with forms of resistance and subversion” (Martin, 2014: 47). 
Derrida “refused the view of language as a transparent medium of communication by 
means of which an autonomous actor could represent an independent reality to another 
without in some way interfering in it.” He claimed that speech does not have power over 
writing as language in any form is still prone to misinterpretation and delays (Martin, 2014: 
47). 
Finally, Martin summarizes the postmodern theory by noting that: 
Postmodern politics does not dispute the effect of all rhetoric and rhetorical 
strategies. Rather, it disputes the claim that there is a single language of 
communication that can stand outside of power relations and arbitrate between all 
voices without remainder. […] It suggests that all universal claims are – at least in 
principle – open to dispute and controversy. The emphasis in postmodern political 
theories is often therefore on legitimizing difference and conflict in rhetorical 
encounters among citizens rather than harmonizing them. (Martin, 2014: 49) 
 
To conclude this whole chapter, we can see how the development and theorization of 
rhetorical skills changed over the course of history, through different political systems 
14 
 
such as democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, absolutism and modern democracy. All of the 
theories in way show how the goal is to persuade the audience, and respectfully, this 
was followed by criticism, as rhetorical practices were perceived to only be a tool of ill-
intent and manipulation. The next chapter focuses exactly on what many deem to be the 
aim of rhetoric, which is persuasion. We will see how persuasion is defined, and later 
analyze how to apply different aspects of it in different kinds of dialogue. 
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CHAPTER 2: PERSUASION 
2.1 PERSUASION AS A BYPRODUCT OF RHETORIC 
When we think of rhetoric, we automatically connect it to the concept of persuasion. On the 
other hand, according to Yoos, when it comes to politics, rhetoric seems to have a much wider 
range of aims than just plain persuasion and along with that, consequences. He explains this in 
the following quote: 
Politics, as with morality, aims at shaping mutually accepted commitments. It 
aims at creating trust. It aims at agreed-upon concerted action toward shared ends 
and agreed-upon negotiated compromises. Such political rhetoric is more than a 
rhetoric that aims at persuasion. It is a rhetoric of bonding. It is a rhetoric of ethos. 
It a rhetoric that uses ethical appeals that gives confidence and trust to people 
seeking to work together and in wanting to share their lives together in mutual 
understanding. (Yoos, 2009: 55) 
That in fact does make sense, but also, there has to be a certain amount of persuasion involved 
in the process – maybe to form a better bond with potential voters, politicians may have to 
resort to persuasion in the sense that they try to create the impression that they measure up to 
some ethical or other standard. Yoos brings up the notion of ethical appeals, however they can 
very much be seen as tools of persuasion themselves – appeals may not always be backed up 
by a speaker’s genuine intention or belief. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the 
audience may not always hold an opposing view. In her essay, Mao presents the general 
situation:  
Our audience normally falls under three general categories: (1) those who are 
opposed to our proposition; (2) those who are neutral to our proposition; and (3) 
those who are sympathetic to our proposition, though not yet having really formed 
their own opinions. (Mao, 1990: 135) 
However, Mao herself does not quite stand by this categorization, as she feels that the 
dynamic of decision-making cannot be systematized – the audience is often prone to 
switching opinions and falling under more of these categories at once, either this being the 
result of the way a speech was delivered, or simply, a shift in their personal convictions  
(Mao, 1990: 135). 
So, this brings out the question of what persuasion is and what it should be defined 
and practiced as to become a tool of gaining support and not a disadvantage (this can be the 
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result of it not being done right – the audience can see through the speaker’s motives and 
disregard whatever they were talking about) in the political aspect? 
In the beginning of his discussion of persuasion, Walton acknowledges that rhetoric 
and persuasion as terms often carry a negative connotation – “Both are then linked with 
deception and sophistical trickery. That line of thought was, of course, Plato’s view of both 
rhetoric and the Sophists” (Walton, 2007: 46). Walton himself does not really accept this view 
as he believes persuasion can be a “legitimate function of argumentation” (Walton, 2007: 46). 
He describes the process of persuasion and what it is: 
Obviously, it involves some sort of change of opinion or acceptance of a belief, 
from an initial state to a new state that is the outcome of the act of persuasion. The 
transition from the one state to the other takes place within an agent, and is 
brought about by a second agent. (Walton, 2007: 46-47) 
Though he mentions only two agents, when we think of political speeches, we usually 
think of way more people, where usually there is not much feedback in the moment it is 
taking place. However, a big part of campaigns and elections are in fact, various 
interviews and debates the candidates have to go through, where immediate feedback is 
possible or even expected, but at the same time it is viewed by the masses – therefore, 
persuasion on a one-on-one level is equally as important as it is on a mass level. How to 
manage both of these aspects in terms of persuasion in theory will be discussed in the 
following sections of this chapter. 
 
  2.2 THE BDI AND COMMITMENT-BASED APPROACH 
One of the problems that we face when we deal with explaining what persuasion is the fact 
that it has not really been researched in depth as a process. Walton states that: 
Persuasion has always been regarded as central to rhetoric as a discipline, as 
reflected in Aristotle’s view of rhetoric and the long tradition stemming from it. 
But somehow no attempt to analyze the cognitive structure of persuasion in a 
precise or logical way has ever been undertaken, or ever been successful at any 
rate. Persuasion has always seemed too psychological for logic, and the social 
sciences have concentrated on the experimental and empirical aspects of it. 
(Walton, 2007: 48) 
Though psychology describes persuasion in a stimulus-response framework concept, Walton 
believes that the perception of the term on such a simple empirical level is not enough to truly 
grasp the full concept of persuasion, especially in politics: 
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Persuasive messages, for example, in political campaign rhetoric or in advertising, 
often strongly depend on the capability of the respondent to recognize and 
interpret actions and statements as being forms of rational argument connecting 
sequences of reasoning. (Walton, 2007: 48) 
However, he states that those who deal with social sciences usually disregard this opinion, as 
they perceive persuasion as purely psychological (Walton, 2007: 49). 
Here he proposes two approaches which appear when dealing with persuasion. The 
first one is the belief-desire-intention approach (or commonly abbreviated as the BDI 
approach), and the other one is the commitment-based approach. 
The BDI approach has been the leading model in analytical philosophy. Walton notes 
that “for the past fifty years or so, the leading work in analytical philosophy of mind has been 
built around the central notions of belief, intention, and desire, and it still is” (Walton, 2007: 
49). However, when it comes to multi-agent systems (such as the general audience) the 
commitment-based approach has been more used in recent times. Walton describes the flow 
of argumentation in this approach: 
The proponent has a claim to be proved, and he must use the respondent’s 
commitments as premises in an argument having his own (the proponent’s) claim 
as the conclusion. […] The principle of commitment-based argumentation 
represents a normative ideal that is present in all my previous writings on 
argumentation. It derives from the notion of commitment first set out by Hamblin 
(1970, 1971) as the core of the method of formal dialogue theory used to analyze 
fallacies. […] Commitment is determined by given speech acts or moves in a 
dialogue, in line with the type of dialogue and the rules governing the moves in 
that type of dialogue. (Walton, 2007: 50) 
Also, he mentions that another important feature in the commitment approach is the 
possibility of retraction, though it cannot always be done freely, as some types of dialogue 
pose certain limitations in that sense (Walton, 2007: 50). 
In order to clarify the distinction between the two approaches, we need to explain the 
difference between belief and commitment. Walton says that “belief is an internal 
psychological notion. Beliefs and desires are private “mental states.” In contrast, 
commitments are public” (Walton, 2007: 51). Walton here refers to what Hamblin states, 
further explaining the distinction: 
At the beginning point of any dialogue, there is a set of commitments called a 
commitment store. As the dialogue proceeds through the various moves, 
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propositions are added to this set or deleted from it. In a dialogue, when a 
commitment is incurred or retracted, the act is external and public. Belief is 
different. It is a matter of private mental states. […] Beliefs are obviously very 
important in psychology. But from a viewpoint of critical argumentation, or 
informal logic and the study of fallacies, it may not be necessary to know what an 
arguer’s actual beliefs are. What matters is how he argued and what positions he 
took. (Walton, 2007: 51) 
Though they seem different, Walton also quotes Hamblin by saying that in a way 
“commitment can act as a kind of persona of belief” (Walton, 2007: 51). In the end, he 
concludes that the commitment approach is better in the field of mass communication, as the 
BDI approach can sometimes lead to unnecessary complications (Walton, 2007: 52). 
 
2.3 DEFINING PERSUASION THROUGH ARGUMENTATION 
Though there is no active dialogue present when giving a speech, it is a foundation of debates 
and interviews. Walton describes how in a commitment set there has to be a notion of correct 
argumentation in dialogue. As he says: “An argument is deductively valid where if the 
premises are true, then necessarily the conclusion is true. Notions of an inductively strong 
argument and a presumptively plausible argument need to be added as well” (Walton, 2007: 
54). Thus, in his attempt to define what persuasion is, he gives out the first out of three 
definitions he proposes throughout the text. This definition divides persuasion into a three-
part sequence: 
So defined, persuasion has three elements. The first element is that the argument 
put forward by the proponent is deductively valid or is otherwise structurally 
correct. This indicates that the inference in the argument is such that the 
conclusion follows from the premises. […] The second element is the 
commitment of the respondent to the premises of the argument. In persuasion, 
commitment is transferred from the premises to the conclusion of an argument. 
The third notion is that of the special proposition that is designated as the 
conclusion of the argument. This proposition is the aiming point of the persuasion. 
(Walton, 2007: 54) 
Moreover, he divides persuasion into two kinds regarding the outcome – a successful act of 
persuasion and a persuasion attempt. This definition is considered to produce a successful act 
of persuasion. However he believes that in this manner persuasion is defined in a limited 
sense, since “There are various ways an arguer might attempt to persuade another arguer to 
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accept something or to do something without being successful or without completing all the 
requirements of the first definition” (Walton, 2007: 54). 
He brings up a critique of the first definition which is modelled as following: 
It isn’t really persuasion if the respondent is already committed to the proposition 
A. For the speech act to be one of persuasion, the respondent must not accept the 
proposition A prior to the act of persuasion. After the act of persuasion by the 
proponent, the respondent then comes to accept A, due to the argument presented 
by the proponent. (Walton, 2007: 56) 
Here we face the problem of how different the propositions must be form one another, since 
the goal here is to change the mind of the respondent – and what happens when that does not 
turn out to be the case. He only proposes that the first definition needs to contain further 
requirement in the case of changing the respondent’s mind, but more setbacks are to happen 
when this is further analyzed (Walton, 2007: 56). 
One of the problems that arise with that is the fact that chaining of argumentation is not 
taken into consideration: 
In persuasion dialogue, the speech act of persuasion is typically not a one-step 
process. Instead, it starts out with one small step of argument, and then proceeds 
through a series of connected steps forming a chain of argumentation. […] The 
reason that the chaining notion is so important to persuasion dialogue is that a 
respondent will naturally tend to resist any argument that seems to go directly 
against or refute his ultimate thesis. (Walton, 2007: 56-57) 
With the assumption that the respondent is initially opposed to proposition A, Walton presents 
the second definition for persuasion:  
The proponent persuades the respondent to accept a designated proposition A as 
true if and only if the proponent puts forward a chain of argumentation meeting 
the following requirements. First, each step, or single inference in the chain, is a 
deductively valid argument. Second, the premises of the argument are all 
propositions that are already commitments of the respondent in the dialogue. 
Third, the ultimate conclusion of the chain of argumentation, at the final step of 
inference, is the proposition A. […] The second definition provides a set of 
criteria that are both necessary and sufficient for the speech act of persuasion 
(Walton, 2007: 59-60) 
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Along with that definition given, Walton then proceeds to single out different types of 
persuasion dialogue that can appear in political talk in order to see if this definition is truly 
representative in all the types of persuasion dialogue.  
The first one is called critical discussion, and it is described simply by stating that “the 
goal of a critical discussion is to resolve the initial conflict of opinions” (Walton, 2007: 61). 
This type is conditioned by the fact that fallacies are violations of its rules (Walton, 2007: 61). 
The second is inquiry or the process where “an investigating group tries to prove some 
designated proposition, to disprove it, or to show that it cannot be either proved or disproved”  
(Walton, 2007: 62). This is very common in interviews and press conferences. 
Another one that is present is interviews and news in media, but not necessarily 
connected to the practice of rhetoric is information-seeking. It is described as “a type of 
dialogue in which one party tries to communicate information to another party” (Walton, 
2007: 62). 
Eristic dialogue is very much present in presidential debates as it is “a quarrelsome 
type of dialogue in which the two parties “hit out” at each other and try to attack each other 
verbally. The goal of each participant is to articulate some grudge or grievance against the 
other” (Walton, 2007: 62). 
However, it seems that persuasion is not exactly the central concept in these types of 
dialogue. In inquiry the goal is more of “trying to collectively prove something by 
establishing it with evidence that cannot later be challenged” (Walton, 2007: 63) rather than 
persuasion itself. Also, persuasion may be involved in how the information is later used, but 
the speech of persuasion is not central to the exchange of information that is the principal 
function of information-seeking dialogue (Walton, 2007: 63). In eristic dialogue the purpose 
of making any move is not to persuade the other party by using a chain of reasoning with 
premises that are commitments of the other party (Walton, 2007: 63). 
The other two types of persuasion dialogue left to define are deliberation and 
negotiation. However, negotiation is not exactly a part of political speeches as it is more of a 
matter of international relations.  
When it comes to deliberation,  
Deliberation is a type of dialogue in which an agent or group of agents is 
confronted with having to make a decision about which course of action to take in 
a given situation. […] In postmodern times, the advent of mass media political 
rhetoric has cast doubt on the ancient Greek notion that deliberation is a form of 
rational discussion that people can engage in with their peers in a city-state. Even 
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so, in the theory of democracy that came to us from the Greeks, deliberation is an 
ideal we can still strive for. (Walton, 2007: 64)  
In situation of multi-agency, deliberation still seems not to have persuasion as a central goal, 
as well as it is not the function of arguments expressed in the process, as it is apparent that 
two opposing sides may have a commonality of goals, which does not help to solve the 
problem of previously given governing questions (Walton, 2007: 68-69). 
In the end, Walton proposes a final definition that explains the process of persuasion, as 
well as encompasses the situation of multi-agency more than the previous two. In short, the 
concept is explained as:  
One has to come to understand the role of retraction in persuasion dialogue. It 
should generally be possible for the respondent to retract a commitment. 
Retracting a proposition, once the other party has shown it is false or indefensible, 
is an important part of rationality. An arguer should be open-minded, and should 
not just stick dogmatically to his opinion, even when he is shown it is wrong. […] 
On the other hand, a respondent should not always be free to retract, in any 
situation. If this were possible, then the proponent could never, at least 
realistically speaking, be capable of successful persuasion. (Walton, 2007: 89) 
This follows that the concepts of successful persuasion and the attempt of persuasion need to 
be distinct from one another. In the aspect of media (or mass-agency) where response is not 
an option, commonly in propaganda, this does make sense in way: 
In persuasion dialogue, the proponent’s goal is to use the commitments of the 
respondent as premises in order to persuade the respondent to also become committed to some 
particular proposition he previously had doubts about accepting. This process of persuading a 
respondent to accept some particular proposition as true is tied in with how propaganda is 
used. (Walton, 2007: 106-107) 
However, propaganda has more goals than just the one above, as correspondingly, “the 
aim of propaganda is to get the respondent to act, to adopt a certain course of action, or to go 
along with and assist in a particular policy” (Walton, 2007: 107). Thus, there arises a question 
of whether propaganda is fully a device of persuasion. Consequently, “defining propaganda as 
a kind of action-getting dialogue, as opposed to a persuasion type of dialogue, it is harder to 
condemn propaganda as being inherently negative in nature” (Walton, 2007: 108), but 
persuasion actually is very present in the process as explained in the previous quotes.  
In conclusion, Walton thinks of propaganda as a separate type of persuasive dialogue:  
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It seems to be a distinctively different type of discourse altogether, even though it 
can directly involve elements of at least five of the six types of dialogue noted. 
[…] It can function in its own right as a normative structure in which arguments 
can be evaluated as used correctly or incorrectly (provided the other normative 
models of dialogue are also used) in a given case. (Walton 2007: 108-109) 
Therefore, along with using different forms of persuasive dialogue, in final, propaganda is 
consisted of ten characteristics: dialogue structure, message content, goal-directed structure, 
involvement of social groups, indifference to logical reasoning, one-sided argumentation, 
involvement of persuasion dialogue, justification by results, emotive language and persuasive 
definitions, and lastly, eristic aspect (Walton, 2007: 109-112). It is clear that it has some 
deviations, but it still uses some characteristic of persuasion discourse types mentioned 
before. 
Finally, Walton gives his explanation on what propaganda is: 
Primarily, it is meant to be part of a normative model of a type of argumentation 
familiar in a kind of conversational discourse known to us in examples of mass 
media argumentation. The definition is primarily dialectical, in that it relates to 
norms of conversation. The normative model is meant to be used in a helpful way 
to identify, analyze, and evaluate argumentation used in particular cases in a given 
text of discourse. (Walton, 2007: 113) 
In conclusion, when mentioning persuasion in terms of politics, we automatically connect it to 
rhetoric. However, it seems that there are more layers to it than expected – the way that 
argumentation is supposed to be formed in order to achieve success of persuasion is quite 
different than the rhetorical practices mentioned in the first chapter. Thus, this chapter sheds a 
light on another way to view speeches, further describing how politics are managed in present 
times. What makes persuasion and rhetoric similar is the intent of influencing an audience 
through speech, but they stray from each other when theorized upon – when it comes to 
rhetorical teachings, the emphasis was mostly on the topics the speakers should address while 
making a speech, and with persuasion, we are more focused on the way we need to form an 
argument to be successful in a certain type of dialogue. I suppose the main distinction can be 
simply presented like this – rhetoric is about what to talk about, while persuasion is more 
about how to talk about something.  
Since both the notions of rhetoric and persuasion have been clarified, it is time to bring 
up what has not been mentioned, yet should be apparent. The discussion connected to them 
mostly serves as sort of a guideline, rather than it is an analysis of actual speeches. In other 
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words, these two chapters showcased a set of rules, and as it is known, sometimes rules only 
seem to work in theory. The next chapter will show what devices are used at achieving these 
goals. 
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CHAPTER 3: SPEECH FIGURES AND APPEALS 
Though rhetorical texts and discussion of persuasion serve as guidelines to make a speech, 
when it actually comes to the very act of speeches, it is apparent that they are prone to a 
certain level of improvisation. Keeping in mind that a good number of political speeches are 
usually previously written at least in a form of notes,  in order to make a successful speech, it 
is important to highlight every topic that is to be mentioned, but also, a set of speech 
techniques is required to make these messages come across. This chapter will thus describe 
and discuss these techniques, as well as discuss which of them in the form of appeals are truly 
effective when it comes to persuasion. 
 
3.1 SPEECH FIGURES 
3.1.1 USAGE OF PRONOUNS 
Fahnestock starts her discussion on the impact of pronouns by saying: 
Whenever there is text, there is an implicit I or we as a source and an implicit you 
addressed, but the personal pronouns need not appear. So actually using them to 
draw attention to the speaker or addressee is a choice the rhetor makes, a choice 
with consequences. (Fahnestock, 2011: 279) 
As mentioned, pronouns serve as a device of emphasis – if there were not so many, the 
possibility of the audience losing concentration would be quite high. Fahnestock also 
concludes that “in speaking, then, between people physically present to each other, the use of 
even an apparently unambiguous referential I or you can have persuasive effects” 
(Fahnestock, 2011: 280). 
When using the pronoun I, it usually implies a position of authority: 
When the speaker’s position or status is clear to the audience, this authoritative I 
need not be foregrounded; it underwrites every statement. I is also sometimes used 
to direct the audience […]. This methodological first person usually features 
speech act verbs: I will argue; I concede; I acknowledged, etc. (Fahnestock, 2011: 
280) 
Also, when it comes to the usage of the pronoun I, the speaker may shift his identity from the 
dominant form to another, in order to give the audience more perspective – Fahnestock gives 
an example of this: 
When, for example, General Douglas MacArthur, dismissed from command by 
President Truman, spoke to Congress in 1951, he specified, perhaps 
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disingenuously, “I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that 
which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow 
American” (Fahnestock, 2011: 281) 
Here we see a shift from the dominant I, which is him as a General, to the other I, which 
represents him as a “fellow American”.  
On the other hand, the pronoun you serves as a direct address when the speaker acknowledges 
the presence of the audience, or makes a demand of them (Fahnestock, 2011: 281). 
Also, the second person perspective can be used to state a hypothesis and Fahnestock gives an 
example:  
The second person also appears in scenes constructed by the rhetor, who by using 
you invites the audience member to imagine himself or herself in a particular 
situation. These scenes starring you are often real scenarios fictionalized, as in the 
following excerpt from Tony Blair’s speech. […] It was Blair himself who 
crossed that room, but he chooses to give agency to you. This choice could be 
described as the generic you, but it has the effect of substituting the listener for the 
speaker so that the audience member fills the prime minister’s role. (Fahnestock, 
2011: 282) 
However, the usage of the pronoun you can have adverse effects, as it can sometimes come 
off as threatening or discomforting. 
The pronoun we carries great potential in achieving successful persuasion. The first 
type, the inclusive we, unites the speaker and listener, for example: “We, the people of the 
United States” (Fahnestock, 2011: 285). The other type, which is the exclusive we, refers to a 
group of people the speaker belongs to, but the audience may not.  
In her text, Fahnestock also mentions Burke’s notion of identification, the purpose of 
which is that “it elevates unity between speaker and audience into the primary source of 
persuasiveness” (Fahnestock, 2011: 285). Thus, she quotes that “You persuade a man only 
insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, 
identifying your ways with his” (Fahnestock, 2011: 285). 
The last notion is not in fact a pronoun, but it encompasses an audience where the usage 
of pronouns fails to express an influential message, but it has similar usage. This notion is 
called the objective voice. As quoted: “The objective voice emerges as the apt choice for 
rhetors who believe they are addressing what The New Rhetoric calls the “universal audience” 
(Fahnestock, 2011: 286). The universal audience is a hypothetical audience, and it can be 
described as “the individual rhetor’s conception of what a correctly prepared and endowed 
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audience would have to agree with” (Fahnestock, 2011: 286). This concept can be of great 
value when it comes to politics: 
This conception of the universal audience clearly changes from person to person, 
group to group, and time to time. A rhetor in 1350 would have a very different 
sense of what any normal person would agree with compared to a rhetor in 1950. 
But with this notion of a universal audience as “what any sane person would agree 
with,” the rhetorical definition of facts comes into view. These are statements that 
the rhetor counts on as believable by anyone. (Fahnestock, 2011: 285) 
Finally, to further explain this notion, Fahnestock gives an example from the debate between 
Richard Nixon as a presidential candidate and J.F. Kennedy as a senator in 1960, by the usage 
and comparison of rhetorical questions:  
What has happened to you? […] What about the prices you pay?  […] What’s the 
net result of this? This means that the average family income went up 15 percent 
in the Eisenhower years as against 2 percent in the Truman years.  […] Following 
its operational definition as absence of address, only the last statement can be 
described as in the objective voice. It does not deliver its content from a particular 
source to a particular addressee as the previous statements do. By contrast, in his 
opening remarks in the first debate, John F. Kennedy stayed in the objective voice 
and never addressed the audience directly. (Fahnestock, 2011: 287) 
 
3.1.2 AMPLIFICATON  
Amplification as a term is quite straightforward. It is, in other words, emphasis and 
enlargement of a certain element. According to Fahnestock, many things can be amplified: 
“The element amplified can be anything from a key word to a factual detail, a telling image to 
an abstract concept, an individual line of argument to a structural feature of the entire 
discourse” (Fahnestock, 2011: 390). However, the use of amplification, especially in politics, 
can sometimes backfire in its intention. In order for this act to be successful, we can turn to 
Quintilian’s five methods which explain how amplification can be achieved successfully. 
The first method, auxesis, is heightening through strategic word choices. As quoted: 
“The basic tactic behind auxesis as an isolated figure of speech might be described as finding 
a term with associations that push in the direction of the assessment the rhetor wants” 
(Fahnestock, 2011: 391). 
Also, another notion in this method that Quintilian presents is the process of word 
substitution, citing Cicero as an example for this: 
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“I have brought before you, judges, not a thief, but a plunderer; not an adulterer, 
but a ravisher; not a mere committer of sacrilege, but the enemy of all religious 
observance and all holy things” (Fahnestock, 2011: 391) 
The second method is series construction. This refers to positioning of a certain word in a 
certain part of a statement. The concept is presented like this:  
An item is heightened when it is placed last in a series that builds up to it as an 
end point, a culmination, the possessor in the highest degree of whatever 
determines the series in the first place. (Fahnestock, 2011: 391) 
Along with that, this method also includes using an item that tops or extends beyond the given 
series. Fahnestock gives an example for this that resonates more with present times: “He was 
best pitcher ever—except for Cy Young.” (Fahnestock, 2011: 392). Also, this also entails the 
usage of “topping” the topping strategy, which in a way, emphasizes the statement and at the 
same time avoids the loss of commentary that can be misinterpreted by the audience. 
Fahnestock gives an example of Lyndon Johnson’s commentary on Kennedy’s assassination, 
where speechlessness is verbalized: “No words are sad enough to express our sense of loss. 
No words are strong enough to express our determination to continue the forward thrust of 
America that he began” (Fahnestock, 2011: 392). 
The third method is the use of comparison to inflate or deflate a situation. This method 
is quite simple and straightforward, as Fahnestock states by giving an example: “The tactic 
here is obvious and frequently used: the comparison of choice in political invective for last 
sixty years has been and still is Hitler” (Fahnestock, 2011: 392). 
The fourth method is heightening through reason or “leading the audience to make an 
inference that results in an amplified assessment of something else” (Fahnestock, 2011: 392). 
As quoted, the purpose of this method is: 
One thing is magnified in order to effect a corresponding augmentation elsewhere, 
and it is by reasoning that our hearers are then led on from the first point to the 
second which we desire to emphasize. (Fahnestock, 2011: 392-393) 
The fifth and last method, that is somewhat connected with the fourth, is heightening by 
directing inferences. This method was usually present in epideictic arguments of praise and 
blame. Fahnestock gives a brief description of such situations: “To enhance the heroism of an 
army, for example, the skill and size of the opposing army is emphasized” (Fahnestock, 2011: 
393).  
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3.1.3 SCHEMES 
Schemes, as Martin puts it, have the following purpose: “Rhetorical schemes arrange words in 
ways that heighten their effect – that is, they draw our attention to the way we read or hear 
them.” (Martin, 2014: 75). Or in other words, schemes “concern the phrasing of sentences 
and produce their effects primarily by way of techniques of repetition, word order and even 
the omission of words.” (Martin, 2014: 75). Martin comments that “schemes enable a degree 
of interaction with the audience that invites them to anticipate the reasoning of the speaker” 
(Martin, 2014: 77). 
The most common techniques used are anaphora, epistrophe and antimetabole, 
anastrophe, antithesis, parallelism, asyndeton, the tricolon (or three-part list), and finally, the 
rhetorical question. 
An anaphora is the repetition of the first words in successive clauses of a sentence. (Martin, 
2014: 75). Martin gives an example from Churchill’s speech:  
“No survival for the British Empire; no survival for all that the British Empire has 
stood for; no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind will 
move forward towards its goal” (Martin, 2014: 75) 
An epistrophe is repetition of the final words of a clause in successive clauses, and 
antimetabole is the repetition of words in reverse order in successive clauses (Martin, 2014: 
75-76). An example of epistrophe would be “live young, die young” and of antimetabole 
would be Kennedy’s “Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for 
your country” (Martin, 2014: 76). 
An anastrophe is the inversion of normal word order (present in the previous example 
– “ask not” is an anastrophe) (Martin, 2014: 76). 
An antithesis is placing emphasis on contrasting terms, for example: “We seek freedom, not 
tyranny” (Martin, 2014: 76). Martin comments that antithesis is “clearly central to political 
debate, where arguments typically aim to differentiate themselves from and declare their 
superiority over each other” (Martin, 2014: 76). 
Parallelism “involves creating a balance or sense of structural equivalence between 
terms (words, phrases or clauses) by omitting intervening words (for example, “our cause is 
just, our goal is clear”)” (Martin, 2014: 76). 
An asyndeton is the omission of conjunctions between clauses to create a continuous flow. An 
example of this is Julius Caesar’s famous “I came, I saw, I conquered” (Martin, 2014: 76). 
The tricolon, or three-part list is frequently found in political speeches. It can involve 
three parallel words (‘Friends, Romans, Countrymen’) or phrases (‘I came, I saw, I 
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conquered’), which build to a powerful conclusion (Martin, 2014: 76). Martin notes that “the 
third step is usually triumphant in relation to the others; it both adds to the order of their 
succession and completes them” (Martin, 2014: 76). 
The last, but certainly not least, is the most recognizable of all schemes – the rhetorical 
question. When using a rhetorical question, “the speaker explicitly asks a question that she 
then goes on to answer herself” (Martin, 2014: 77). Martin again gives an example from 
Churchill’s speech:  
You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all 
costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may 
be; for without victory, there is no survival. (Martin, 2014: 77, quoted from 
Churchill, 1940: 188) 
 
3.1.4 TROPES 
Martin defines tropes as: 
Tropes involve the use of particular words to connote certain meanings. Here 
effort is directly focused on creating or specifying meaning rather than arranging 
words and phrases for effect. By consequence, tropes are often closely connected 
to the premises and conclusions of an argument. (Martin, 2014: 77) 
Metaphors, analogies, metonyms and synecdoches all belong to the group of tropes. 
A metaphor is basically a “substitution of one or more terms for another in order to 
invoke a kind of comparison and […] implies an identity between otherwise different things” 
(Martin, 2014: 78). 
Martin gives an example how it can be used: 
The substantive content of a speech may well use a metaphor either as a premise or 
even as a conclusion. For instance, after 11 September 2001 the claim to be undertaking a 
‘war on terror’ was used as a premise to enable some fairly extraordinary uses of military and 
legal powers by western states against ‘terrorism’. (Martin, 2014: 78) 
Analogical reasoning or simply, an analogy, is “an inductive style of argumentation that 
works by presenting a particular case as ‘being like’ or sharing features, with another case 
such that we should react in the same way” (Martin, 2014: 78). Martin notes that these 
arguments are common when it comes to pragmatics in politics, where practical examples are 
more used than universal principles to make sense of specific issues (Martin, 2014: 78).   
Martin singles out some of the most noticeable analogies used in politics: 
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Analogies of war, ‘rape’, ‘theft’ or being on a ‘battlefield’ are common in 
international politics and conflict, but so too are more cooperative analogies, such 
as appeals to ‘family’, ‘humanity’, ‘special relationships’ and so on. (Martin, 
2014: 78-79) 
A metonym “involves the substitution of a word or concept with another that has particular 
connection with the object in question” (Martin, 2014: 79). Martin clarifies this by giving an 
example:  “Governments are often referred to in the media by the location of their executive 
seats (for example, ‘Washington’ for the US, ‘Beijing’ for China)” (Martin, 2014: 79). 
Lastly, a synecdoche is “a type of metonym for which an actual element of an object comes to 
stand in for the whole, or the whole for a part” (Martin, 2014: 79). Synecdoches can 
sometimes carry negative connotations as they are used as generalizations of groups:  
Referring to whole groups or communities by distinguishing one feature, for 
example, is a common use of synecdoche: ‘gays are demanding equal rights’, 
‘Muslims are under threat’, ‘the French capitulated to the Germans’ and so on. 
(Martin, 2014: 80) 
In the end, Martin concludes that the flexibility of tropes can benefit politicians in their 
speeches: 
One way for political actors to escape a downturn in their fortunes – such as 
hostile public opinion or a series of events that go against stated aims or principles 
– is to redescribe the situation by changing the dominant metaphors. (Martin, 
2014: 80) 
 
3.2 APPEALS 
Speech figures are mostly stylistic components of appeals by which the speaker influences the 
audience. Appeals are usually distinct in themes – in this part, the appeals that will be 
analyzed in terms of their efficiency are those to fear, pity and popular opinion. 
 
3.2.1 APPEALS TO FEAR 
Walton notes that appeals to fear are nowadays commonly used in many fields: “Fear appeal 
arguments are currently in vogue with advertisers, corporations, public relations firms, and 
government agencies – all the powerful organizations that use the media to mold public 
opinion.” (Walton, 2007: 131). When it comes to politics, they are used “particularly by 
advocacy groups in rhetoric designed to influence legislation on public policy issues” 
(Walton, 2007: 132). 
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However, the issue that arises when dealing with the notion of appeals to fear is the 
uncertainty of the audience in terms whether these statements are actually reasonable due to 
the fact that fear itself a very negative term. Walton points out that: 
Social scientists have conducted many empirical investigations of fear appeal 
arguments to try to see how they work to change behavior and attitudes with 
experimental subjects. The general perception is that fear appeal arguments do 
work, but not everyone agrees. Some think that such arguments are inherently 
negative and that positive ones work better to persuade an audience to take action. 
(Walton, 2007; 133) 
The thing with appeals to fear is the fact that they have a proneness to be fallacious. Walton 
remarks: 
In the logical tradition, fear appeal arguments have been treated under the 
category of the argumentum ad baculum, which includes the use of threats and 
force in argumentation, as well as fear appeals. (Walton, 2007: 134) 
The structure of these appeals is based on two premises.  
The first premise has the following property: 
The first premise presents a state of affairs that is dangerous to the respondent, 
and is often called “threatening.” It represents a harm to the respondent, in the 
sense of something that is very much against the respondent’s personal goals and 
interests. (Walton, 2007: 148) 
The second premise and the conclusion are described as: 
The second premise cites a recommended course of action such that if the 
respondent takes it, he will avoid the disastrous outcome stated in the first 
premise. The conclusion is that the respondent should take the recommended 
course of action. (Walton, 2007: 148) 
Here is an example of this argumentation: 
In the fear appeal ads used by the NRA […] the dangerous situation portrayed is 
that of young women being killed by a serial murderer because they had to wait to 
buy a gun and were unable to defend themselves. The recommended course of 
action is not to vote for or support the Brady bill or other policies advocated by 
the “antigun lobby.” The reason is that these policies delay the buying of a gun to 
be used for self-defense. (Walton 2007: 148) 
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This example might seem straightforward, but the issue occurs when we weigh out whether 
this is the only way to prevent such a situation from happening. Walton explains this issue 
through the empirical model of persuasion:  
According to the dual process model of persuasion, receivers of a persuasive 
message may go for the short-cut solution instead of engaging in the extensive 
elaboration required to think through the problem. In this case, the solution is not 
all that easy. […] Instead of immediately either accepting or rejecting the 
argument expressed in the ad, the rational approach would be to think critically 
about the practical aspects of the proposal being advocated. (Walton, 2007: 150) 
In conclusion, it is hard to explain whether appeals to fear actually work or not. For a certain 
amount of time they can be successful, but eventually it can be proven that there were other 
alternatives. In the political aspect, this usually appears in the form of post-election regret. 
 
3.2.2 APPEALS TO PITY 
Walton says that appeals to pity “have been widely used by public relations experts in 
commercial ads and initiatives of various kinds” (Walton, 2007: 134). 
The structure of appeals to pity is similar to the one of appeals to fear: “As with the 
fear appeal argument, a way out, in the form of some recommended action, is offered. The 
conclusion is that the respondent should take this recommended course of action” (Walton, 
2007: 151). 
Appeals to pity are also prone to uncertainty and fallacies: 
The fallacious uses of appeal to pity have been widely illustrated in the traditional 
treatment of the ad misericordiam fallacy in the logic textbooks. It is not hard to 
appreciate why this type of argumentation has been classified as a fallacy. 
(Walton, 2007: 136) 
Appeals to pity also have another disadvantage, but this disadvantage can sometimes turn into 
an advantage, especially in public debate: 
One fault often cited in logic textbooks is failure of relevance. But in some cases, 
appeals to pity can be relevant, yet still fallacious because they are exploited to 
have a much greater impact than should properly be the case. The successful use 
of such arguments for purposes of persuading an audience often has to do with the 
timing of the argument at the opportune moment in presenting a larger body of 
evidence. If the case hangs in the balance, a strategic use of appeal to pity just at 
the right moment can tilt the burden of proof enough toward one side to make a 
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big difference in the outcome of the case. […] Emotional arguments, such as 
appeals to fear or pity, are in fact often the most highly persuasive on matters of 
public debate. In principle, then, such arguments should be regarded as relevant, 
unless it can be shown in specific cases why they are not. (Walton, 2007: 137) 
To sum up, just like with appeals to fear, appeals to pity can be disregarded only if we find 
proof that they are only used as a device of persuasion without an actually beneficial end 
result. 
 
3.2.3 APPEALS TO POPULAR OPINION 
When referring to this appeal, “the proponent tries to get the respondent to accept an opinion 
or perform an action because that opinion is accepted by the popular majority” (Walton, 2007: 
198). 
Walton remarks, just like the other appeals aforementioned, appeals to popular opinion 
are also prone to fallacies: 
Traditional logic textbooks have portrayed the argumentum ad populum as a 
fallacy. Yet many arguments used in media ads are based on appeal to public 
opinion as a means of marketing commercial products. (Walton, 2007: 198) 
However, appeals to popular opinion are significantly more flexible in nature than those of 
fear or pity: 
What is involved in such mass media influence attempts is a feedback effect. The 
proponent bases his argument on what he takes popular opinion to be at any given 
point. Then as developments change and new information comes in, the proponent 
must also try to get some notion of how public opinion has changed on the issue. 
(Walton, 2007: 201) 
The basic structure of this argument is “Everybody accepts proposition A, therefore A must 
be true.” (Walton, 2007: 202). Though the majority of the people in the audience tend to think 
of themselves as authentic individuals, this argument is quite successful in the aspect of 
democracy: 
As Hamblin noted, “it is not clear from the name (argumentum ad populum) that 
it does not consist of the purest valid reasoning, and only an anti-democrat could 
unhesitatingly assume the contrary.” Thus there is ambivalence about appeal to 
popular opinion as a form of argument. […] In mass media rhetorical arguments 
of the kind so commonly used in democratic politics, public opinion is probably 
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the most important factor in the success of any argument. (Walton, 2007: 202-
203) 
The points given in this type of appeal always change, so it is to conclude that: 
What appears to follow from this assumption is that the latest moral viewpoint 
must be more enlightened than any previous one. If you do not follow the dictates 
of this viewpoint, negative language may be used to describe your conduct or 
viewpoint, like “racist” or “sexist.” (Walton, 2007: 212) 
Finally, it is quite easy to close this topic with the assumption that in order for the appeals to 
public opinion to work, the speaker must be careful, attentive and always up to date; 
otherwise whatever intentions are contained in political messages will be most likely 
disregarded. 
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CONCLUSION 
To summarize the discussion of the whole paper, we must be aware of historical changes in 
political conduct that had shaped the way we approach politics in this day and age, so we can 
form our opinions and propositions as effectively as possible.  
In the first chapter this development has been explained in terms of how rhetoric was 
shaped with regard to the political environment of a certain point in history, from Ancient 
Greek democracy and Roman oligarchy to monarchism in the Renaissance and the absolutist 
early modern period, and finally, contemporary democracy. The importance of this chapter is 
to show how political relations and rhetoric used to work through history, which can give us 
an image on how we may divide our attention in speeches when certain topics that are still 
relevant come to mind. I feel that disregarding some practices made in the past are pointless, 
as sometimes these mistakes make a ground for future changes.   
Then, in the second chapter, the notion of persuasion shows its complexity even 
though it seems that it has only one goal in mind, which is often followed by negative 
connotations. When it comes to types of persuasive dialogue, we get an insight on how to 
divide our goals of persuasion in that respect in order to achieve success. This chapter 
highlights how we should look beyond a concept that seems to be quite simple, especially 
because it is present everywhere. It also helps us to understand how different dialogues are 
formed and how they function in different situations. I personally think that persuasion can be 
used for both good and bad causes – that just depends on the matter of what the persuasion is 
about. 
Lastly, the third chapter shows us the significance of speech figures and appeals used 
in rhetoric and forms of persuasive dialogue. Speech figures and appeals are tools by which a 
speaker’s plan to influence an audience as effectively as possible is made easier. In theory, all 
methods make sense, but when it comes to the moment of speech, a lot of these methods can 
be either omitted or used in an improper way. Personally, I believe that for example, the 
appeal to public opinion is fundamental, but it is not exactly executed in the fashion it has 
been set to operate. To give an example, the main thing about appealing to public opinion is to 
always be up to date. As we have seen in these past two years, Trump, who has been called 
both racist and sexist became the president of the United States. His use of appeals to fear 
seemed to work (immigrant issues) though many disagreed, and also, he used quite old-
fashioned values when it comes to popular opinion, and a lot of people were taken aback. His 
speeches and debates are known for using much emphasis as well as interruptions, and I feel 
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his most used form in terms of persuasion discourse was the usage of eristic dialogue (where 
speakers just seem to ‘hit out’ at each other to prove a point), which in a way, while debating 
in a very different manner from previous candidates, might have intrigued the audience and 
eventually ensured him the victory. 
All in all, following this example, we cannot completely predict the course of events 
after a political speech has been made just by referring to the usage of certain rhetorical 
practices and persuasive devices in it, though they are helpful when creating political theories. 
In addition, we must see how the audience interacts within itself and how it perceives the 
speaker as a figure and take that into consideration.  
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